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      • Hope Turns to Despair as Sudan Peace Deal Unravels

Hope Turns to Despair as Sudan Peace Deal Unravels

 

The song, dance and ululations that marked the historic signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to end more than two decades of a bloody civil war in Sudan, have now been replaced by despair and disillusionment.

 

Indeed, all indications are that the CPA, signed between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the former rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) on January 9, 2005, is facing imminent collapse due to blatant sabotage and lack of political will by the NCP and a weak and disjointed SPLM/A.

 

In a January 2006 report, Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The long road ahead, the International Crisis Group (ICG) think tank warned of a real risk of renewed conflict unless the NCP begins to implement the CPA in good faith, and the SPLM becomes a stronger and more effective implementing partner.

 

In its latest report, A strategy for comprehensive peace in Sudan, released towards the end of July 2007, the ICG says nothing much has changed and warns that a more deadly civil war could break out in the country any time, unless the international community steps in.

 

ICG is not alone in warning of an impending conflict. Various observers of Sudan's political landscape see a country on the verge of war, with parties to the CPA realising that the agreement was forced down their throats. Besides, many observers saw the collapse of the CPA coming, for Sudan has earned notoriety as a country that does not honour peace agreements. In a country that has witnessed five coups since independence, one cannot rule out vested interests scuttling the peace process.

 

The war so 2 million people killed and another 4 million displaced,

 

The strategy of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad) mediation team and its international partners was to balance the NCP's expected reluctance to implement the CPA by having a strong SPLM minority partner in the national government, and by using the continued engagement of the international community to guarantee the agreement.

 

On the other hand, the strategy pursued by the NCP aimed at establishing a strong political partnership with the more popular SPLM by drawing it away from its historic allies in the opposition, allowing the NCP continued stay in power and completion of its transformation from a pariah state into an accepted member of the international community.

 

Yet, the CPA, if effectively implemented could provide a lasting solution to some of the conflicts bedevilling Sudan. It offers a rare opportunity to break the cycle of violence and make peace the new and lasting norm for future generations of a new Sudan. There is no doubt it offers a unique mechanism for solving issues of religious and cultural diversity and a new framework for democratic transformation and good governance. Unfortunately, it is a long and complex agreement, and hence difficult to monitor effectively.

 

With more than 50 national bodies and commissions to be formed, multiple systems and levels of government (with the Government of Southern Sudan and southern state governments to be formed almost from scratch), the parties, partners and observers are understandably overwhelmed.

 

Without universally accepted criteria for assessing implementation, there is a debate among both the parties and observers on the interpretation of the implementation process. This is the loophole that the NCP has exploited for its own political survival. For the picture that emerges is that of a pattern of NCP attempts to systematically undermine, delay or simply ignore the elements called for in the CPA that would fundamentally alter the status quo and its grip on power.

 

On the other hand, the SPLM/A is facing enormous challenges, which are severely undermining its ability to function as an effective partner in government. It is not lost on observers that the SPLM/A leadership has been concentrating its energies in the south and has been unable to successfully or consistently challenge the NCP on most issues relating to implementation.

 

Admittedly, the SPLM is in disarray, still coping with its transition from a rebel movement to a government and the death of its chairman John Garang on July 30, 2005, just three weeks after he had been sworn in as the First Vice-President. It currently lacks the strategic vision to consolidate its place on the national scene as the natural umbrella for all the marginalised and the oppressed and as the guardian of the democratisation project that the CPA envisions.

 

It cannot be gainsaid that Dr Garang's death dealt a major blow to the CPA in general and the SPLM in particular. Following his death, SPLM's vision has remained blurred, with the NCP abandoning its strategy for a political partnership with the SPLM, as clearly manifested at the January 2007 celebrations to mark the second anniversary of the CPA, when President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and his Southern Sudan counterpart Salva Kiir accused each other in public of sabotaging the implementation of the peace deal. Fears abound that following Dr Garang's death, peace may not hold in Sudan as no leader within the SPLM has the requisite diplomatic skills as well as the respect of southern military field commanders - qualities that enabled Dr Garang to negotiate for the CPA.

 

Analysts predict that a war may soon break out in Southern Sudan especially now that internal divisions and contradictions define its political landscape. They observe that full compliance with the CPA may not be possible as matters may be compounded by lack of political will or resistance from elements within the two parties.

 

The fears have been exacerbated by what observers see as Dr Garang's major weakness - his failure to delegate, which made it difficult for potential successors to gain the necessary leadership experience.

 

It is also noteworthy that the bulk of the agreement was directly negotiated by then First Vice-President Ali Osman Taha and Dr Garang, aided by a small group of trusted aides, with the two leaders counting on their positive personal relationship to overcome obstacles.

 

Still, the GoSS is facing some acute threats, most noticeably from the lack of progress on reorganising the SPLA into a professional army, and the extended delays in paying its troops and civil servants. There is a real threat of mutiny by the soldiers who go for several months without pay.

 

But what poses the greatest danger is the failure of the implementation of the Abyei Boundary Protocol. The district of Abyei, claimed by both the north and south, remains a potential flashpoint in the aftermath of Dr Garang's death. Though the CPA defined it as a traditional territory of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, the Abyei Boundary Commission Report of 2005 defined the area broadly - north of the Bahr el-Arab (River Kiir) to the east of Abyei town all the way to the Upper Nile border.

 

As expected, the report elicited threats of violence from the Misseriya community, who continue to view the Abyei agreement, with its built-in referendum to choose between joining the north or south, as a zero-sum game in which they risk losing their traditional grazing routes to the Dinka and ultimately to an independent south.

 

Though President Bashir has stated publicly that he disagrees with it, there are fears that hardline elements in Khartoum may seek to use the Misseriya as proxies to destabilise the region and scuttle the CPA, particularly as the Commission included the region's oil-rich areas within Abyei's boundaries.

 

What needs to be done to forestall a possible conflict is to give an assurance to both the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities that their land and grazing rights will be guaranteed irrespective of the referendum's outcome.

 

It is unfortunate that the international community has remained a spectator as the NCP continues to violate the CPA. It urgently needs to convene a high-powered meeting of both parties to resolve issues that are threatening to get out of hand.

 

Equally, the UN, World Bank, United States, United Kingdom, Norway, Italy, other donor countries and Igad member states should now offer financial support and technical expertise to combat the greatest immediate threats to the CPA. The donors should honour the financial pledges they made for the reconstruction of Southern Sudan whose dilapidated infrastructure ,remains a disincentive to potential investors.

 

The international community should also provide the SPLM with the technical aid to help it attain its fair share of oil revenue, and develop the capacity to manage the oil sector in the south.

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